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The eﬀectiveness of sentencing as an instrument to deter crime has long been debated.
Not only have the debates been conducted at a theoretical level, but there has not yet been
au n i ﬁed view on the eﬀectiveness of sentencing in the level empirical1 and experimental
studies2. So far economists analyse individuals’ oﬀending behaviour based on decision
theory and game theory. The former approach has been used in Becker’s (1968) seminal
paper3 and the latter has been introduced by Tsebelis (1989)4.
According to Tsebelis (1989), the interaction of agents in criminal justice is better
being analysed using game theory on the ground that the probabilities of success and
failure in committing an oﬀence are aﬀected by the interactions of rational players. The
results from Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and Tsebelis in Bianco et al, 19905)
studies show that, on the contrary to Becker’s (1968) propositions, there is no ground to
argue that an increase in the severity of punishment will reduce the likelihood of individ-
uals, or ﬁrms (countries) to commit illegal activities (to breach international law). Any
attempts to increase the severity of punishment are counter productive since individuals’
or ﬁrms’ behaviour will not be aﬀected, instead the policy adversely aﬀects the intensity
of the authority to impose the law. Although Tsebelis (1991, 1992) uses the same game
to analyse phenomena in the areas of industrial policy and international relation, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the application of our analysis in both ﬁelds.
1For instance Ehrlich (1975, 1977) and Passell and Taylor (1977) among others.
2See Estes (1944), Azrin (1959a, 1959b, and 1960), Appel (1961 and 1963) and Storms et al (1962)
for food-motivated behavioural experiments by inducing electric shock to animals. See also Gneezy and
Rusticini (2004) for series of experiments of providing ﬁnancial rewards to students and imposing a small
ﬁne to parents who are late in picking up their children from day-care nursery.
3This paper has inspired the development of crime economics. Surveys in this area have been conducted
by Eide (2000), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), and Bowles (2000), among others.
4This article triggered a long debate which involved several authors including William Bianco and
Peter Ordeshook in Bianco et al. (1990), Weissing and Ostrom (1991), Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1992),
Tsebelis (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and Tsebelis in Bianco et al. 1990) and Andreozzi (2004).
5The paper consists of three parts written separately by William Bianco, Peter Ordeshook and George
Tsebelis. The paper discusses William Bianco’s and Peter Ordeshook’s comments on Tsebelis’ (1989)
paper and a reply from Tsebelis on their comments.
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and Tsebelis in Bianco et al, 1990). Tsebelis (1989) claims that the results of Becker’s
(1968) analysis do not withstand game-theoretical scrutiny. In section 2, we discuss the
comparability between Becker’s (1968) and Tsebelis’ (1989) models. In addition to the
use of diﬀerent analytical tools, we identify several factors which should be taken into
consideration in order to compare both models.
The reﬁnement of the inspection game is presented in Section 3. Empirical evidence
from various studies, which primarily conducted in the UK, will be used to re-construct
the game. In this article, our working assumption is that the severity of punishment has
a positive correlation with the costs to deliver courts’ sentences. Several studies which
mainly conducted recently in the UK, provide evidence for this assumption6.
There are three procedures available to the authority to increase the severity of pun-
ishment, either a) to increase the severity of direct punishments (e.g, ﬁnes, imprisonment
and community service), b) to increase the severity of indirect punishment (e.g, the list
of positions that cannot be taken by ex-oﬀenders, the length of period for criminal justice
institutions to keep ex-oﬀenders’ records, the period in which ex-oﬀenders have to report
their mobility to police), or c) a combination of both methods. In any settings we found
that an increase in the severity of punishment will reduce the likelihood of the enforcement
of the law. This result holds so long as that the policy increases individuals’ disutility of
serving courts’ sentences and the immediate utility to oﬀend is unaﬀected by the policy.
The probability to enforce the law may vary, namely either decrease, increase or remain
the same, if it is assumed that the policy increases individuals’ immediate utility to of-
fend. In any case, the impact of the policy to individuals’ oﬀending behaviour may not
be easily determined. The likelihood to oﬀend may increase, decrease or remain the same
depending on the marginal net beneﬁts of the policy to the authority. Further discussion
of this topic can be found in Section 4.
Instead of increasing the severity of punishment, theoretically, the authority may re-
duce individuals’ oﬀending behaviour by providing ﬁnancial compensation to those who
6See Bowles, et al., 2004, Bowles and Pradiptyo, 2004, Chapman et al., 2002, and Department of
Constitutional Aﬀairs, 2004.
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empirically have been implemented by providing support to a group of people who are at
risk to oﬀend. The results show that the implementation of crime prevention initiative is
going to reduce both the probabilities to oﬀend and to enforce the law. Please see Section
5 for further discussion of the topic.
2 Comparability between Tsebelis’ and Becker’s Mod-
els
The main contrast between Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990, 1993 and Tsebelist in Bianco et al.
1990) and Becker’s (1968) models lies in the eﬀectiveness of criminal justice interventions
to deter or to prevent individuals from having a criminal career. The discrepancies of
results between both models arise due to the use of diﬀerent analytical tools as Tsebelis
(1989, p 84) stated:
’The logical and empirical evidence in favor of the game-theoretic approach
indicates that both dominant approaches to crime prevention - the sociolog-
ical and the economic - are partial and short-run in nature. They are both
based on the assumption that modifying the incentive structure of a ratio-
nal agent (modifying payoﬀs) will aﬀect that agent’s behaviour. Reasonable
and plausible as this assumption may seem, it was shown not to withstand
game-theoretic scrutiny.’
Individuals’ oﬀending behaviour has been modelled as a one-shot 2x2 game between





Oﬀend a1,a 2 b1,b 2
Not Oﬀend c1,c 2 d1,d 2
Game 1
4
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T h eg a m ed o e sn o th a v eap u r es t r a t e g ye q u ilibrium, instead it has a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium. The implication of this result is that total reduction in the number of
oﬀences is impossible. Let p be the probability of public to oﬀend and q be the probability
of police to enforce the law. The mixed strategy equilibrium of the game is as follows









b1 − d1 + c1 − a1
(2)
Tsebelis (1989) argued that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will
alter the payoﬀs of individuals only, namely a0
1 <a 1 and c1 >a 0
1. This policy leaves
the frequency to violate the law at equilibrium (p∗) unchanged (theorem 2 of Tsebelis,
1989), however it decreases the likelihood of the police to enforce the law (q0∗) (theorem
3 of Tsebelis, 1989). Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1992) labelled these results as Payoﬀ
Irrelevance Proposition (PIP)7. A similar result can be obtained if attempts have been
made by the authority to increase either c1 or d1 (welfare measures) (theorem 4 and 5 of
Tsebelis 1989). Tsebelis (1989) claims that the results are robust to any alterations in
the settings8.
Tsebelis’ (1989) argument that individuals’ oﬀending behaviour is more appropriately
analysed using game theory rather than decision theory have been widely accepted and
appreciated. Nevertheless, his controversial proposition on the ineﬀectiveness of punish-
ment has attracted many critics (see Bianco et al. 1990, Hirschleifer & Rasmusen, 1992
and Weissing & Ostrom, 1991). Most of the comments focus on proving that the PIP
phenomena applies only in certain conditions, for instance the game is played by no more
than 2 players9, the game with discrete payoﬀs is played simultaneously, or the game is
7Please see Wittman (1985) for further discussion on the PIP.
8For instance, the game is played by more than 2 players, the game is played under imperfect infor-
mation, the game is played sequentially or simultaneously, and the game is played by rational players or
by unsophisticated players as in evolutionary game theory.
9Peter Ordeshook in Bianco et al (1990) and Weissing and Ostrom (1991).
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Despite the overwhelming criticisms, little attempts have been made to comment on
the construction of the game. Apart from the use of diﬀerent analytical tools, several
factors below should be taken into account in order to compare both model:
1. Players and their roles. There are two players in Becker’s (1968) model, namely
individuals and criminal justice authority, in which police are a part of the organ-
isation. The criminal justice authority (CJA) determines the levels of punishment
and enforcement of the law. It is clear, therefore, that the CJA ﬁnances the de-
livery of sentences and also the enforcement of the law. In Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990,
1993) and Tsebelis’ in Bianco et al. (1990) models, however the game is played by
representative agents namely police and public. It is not clear whether the police is
part of the criminal justice authority or not. In addition to that their role is limited
only to enforce the law.
2. The endogeneity of punishment. In Becker’s (1968) model, the levels of punishment
and enforcement of the law are determined endogenously by CJA. In contrast, the
level of punishment is an exogenous factor in Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990 and 1993) models.
Attempts have been made to endogenise this variable by introducing the legislature
as the third player (Tsebelis in Bianco et al., 1990), however, the legislature does
not have the authority to detemine the level of enforcement.
3. Objective function. In Becker’s (1968) model, the CJA inﬂuences individuals’ behav-
iour by ﬁnding the optimum level of punishment and enforcement which minimise
social costs. In contrast, police in Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990, 1993) and Tsebelis’ in
Bianco et al. (1990) models do not share this objective. Since police do not concern
with the net beneﬁts of altering punishments, consequently, an increase in the level
of punishment aﬀects individuals’ payoﬀs but leaves police’s payoﬀsu n a l t e r e d .
Any attempts to compare both models should alter one of the constructions and these
can be done from several avenues. First, one might analyse the case as a 2 stage game.
10Weissing and Ostrom, 1991.
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law. In stage 2, given the level of punishment and the budget available, the police and
public play the game.
Second, the game can be maintained as a 2 player 2x2 game, however, the police
should be replaced by the CJA. In this setting, the CJA sets the level of punishment and
also the level of enforcement of the law. In this case, the police are a part of the CJA. Not
only does the CJA set the level of punishment and the level of enforcement of the law,
they also set the performance indicators for the police. In this model, both the severity
of punishment and the intensity of enforcement of the law are considered as endogeneous
variables. In this case, there is no justiﬁcation to separate the role of the police and the
C J A ,s i n c et h ep o l i c ea r eac o m p o n e n to ft h eC J A .
Third, a combination of both approaches above can be used, which will be presented
in the following sections. In addition to that we assume that any criminal justice inter-
ventions (e.g. either to increase the level of punishment or to initiate crime prevention
initiatives) are costly. The implication of these settings is that any attempts to increase
the level of punishment or to initiate crime prevention initiatives will aﬀect both players’
payoﬀs.
3 The Revised Inspection Game
We model phenomena in criminal justice as a 2 player 2x2 one-shot game played
by representative agents, namely public and enforcer. It is assumed that the enforcer is
a broader institution than the police, yet the enforcer is part of a higher organisation
n a m e l yt h eC J A .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h eC J Aﬁnances the enforcer and it has an authority
to set the level of punishment. Given the punishment regime, the enforcer has duties to
enforce the law and to deliver criminal justice interventions including sentencing. This
setting is consistent with Tsebelis’ (1989, 1990, 1993) and Tsebelis in Bianco et al. (1990)
models which assumed that the level of punishment is exogenous. At the same time, it
accommodates Becker’s (1968) model by incorporating the allocation of resources by the
enforcer in tackling crime.
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analysed using the principal-agent theory. The CJA, as a principal, has an authority
to set objectives or goals which should be fulﬁlled by the enforcer. These goals can be
used as performance measures against the enforcer’s eﬀorts. It is apparent that the level
of enforcement by the enforcer depends on the guidance and ﬁnancial support from the
CJA. In the UK, for instance, the Secretary of State for Home Aﬀairs publishes a national
policing plan every three years which sets targets of national policing. Accordingly, each
police force at regional level should develop their own plan, which conforms with the
national plan and at the same time accommodates local issues (Home Oﬃce, 2002).
Ideally, the interaction between public and the enforcer in the area of criminal justice
should be analysed as a repeated game. The disutility of being convicted, for instance,
is not limited only in serving direct punishment (e.g., to pay ﬁne, or stay in prison) but,
more importantly, there is a substantial reduction of potential future wealth due to loss of
reputation (we deﬁne this as an indirect punishment). This negative reputation eﬀect is
similar to the impact of not obtaining qualiﬁcations to individuals’ future income. Thus
it can be seen that the decision to commit crime or not is similar to the decision to obtain
educational qualiﬁcation, even though the impacts are in the opposite directions. If we
pursue the analysis in a one-shot game, these reputation eﬀects should be taken into
considerations in the model.





Oﬀend a1,a 2 b1,b 2
Not Oﬀend c1,c 2 d1,d 2
Game 2
where: c1 >a 1,a 2 >b 2,d 2 >c 2,b 1 <d 1.
A further modiﬁcation from Tsebelis’ (1989) model lies in the speciﬁcation of the
payoﬀs. In the original model, all the elements in the payoﬀs are aggregated, in the sense
that each element in the cell (i.e. a,b,c and d) represents the net beneﬁts of choosing a
8
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of each element in the payoﬀ matrix.
a1 = UO − UD (3)
b1 = UO + UR (4)
c1 = d1 = UR (5)
a2 = BE − CE − CS (6)
b2 =0 (7)
c2 = BR − CE (8)
d2 = BR (9)
Where:
UO = Immediate utility arises from committing an oﬀence
UD = Disutility of serving direct punishment (e.g., imprisonment, ﬁne, community
service)
UR = Positive reputational eﬀects to individuals for not being convicted
BE = Beneﬁts of enforcing the law including the detection of incidents and any deter-
rence eﬀects arise due to enforcement of the law.
BR = Reputational beneﬁts in achieving objectives set by the CJA
CE = Costs of enforcement of the law including, for instance, costs of investigation
and costs to dispatch police oﬃcers in certain areas.
CS = Costs to deliver courts’ sentences, including direct and indirect punishments
(e.g., the list of positions that cannot be taken by ex-oﬀenders, the length of probationary
period, and the length of period oﬀenders have to report to police about their mobility).
9
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positive reputation eﬀects (reputation eﬀects from here after) UR. Parts of this eﬀect
are: easy access to ﬁnancial services (e.g., mortgages, interest-free credit facilities), being
respected and trusted by friends, neighbours and colleagues, having freedom to travel,
and easy access to labour market. This eﬀect does not apply, however, to individuals who
are convicted. Once an individual has been convicted, his/her life will not be the same
again since their access to job market11, their future wealth and also their mobility12 may
be adversely aﬀected by the loss of reputation eﬀects (−RU)( w ed e ﬁne this as indirect
punishments from here after).
From public’s perspective, committing an oﬀence produces immediate beneﬁts UO,
either in terms of material well-being or psychological rewards (e.g., admirations from
other criminals or relieve from peer pressures). By the same token this activity produces
disutility to individuals (UD) if they are convicted and have to serve courts’ sentences (we
deﬁne this as direct punishments from here after). The longer (higher) the imprisonment
term (ﬁnes) is, the higher the disutility of serving direct punishment (UD). The disutility
of serving direct punishment are ranging from the loss of earning to the loss of liberty due
to serving sentences.
Our working assumption is that the disutility of serving direct punishment (UD)i s
independent to the loss of reputational eﬀects (−UR) following serving direct punishment.
As a consequence there are three possible strategies for the CJA to increase the severity of
punishment which are: a) to increase the severity of direct punishment (UD), for instance
by increasing the period of imprisonment or increasing the value of ﬁne levied; or b)
to increase the severity of indirect punishment. This can be achieved, for instance, by
extending the length of period for keeping individuals’ criminal records, by extending
types of positions which cannot be taken by ex-oﬀenders, or by extending the period of
oﬀenders to report their mobility to police after their release; or c) the combination of
both approaches above.
11In many countries, for instance, individuals with criminal history cannot be entitled to take the posts
of police oﬃcer, soldier, or civil servant. For the case of sexual oﬀenders, they are not allowed to take a
job which involves direct interactions with children.
12This applies particularly to convicted paedophiles or sexual oﬀenders.
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not, he/she will earn immediate utility to oﬀend (UO) .I nt h ec a s ef o rw h i c ht h el a wh a s
not been enforced, an oﬀender enjoys immediate utility to oﬀend (UO) and, at the same
time, he/she keeps positive reputational eﬀects (UR) intact.
In case the law has been enforced and an individual commits an oﬀence, the oﬀender
will earn immediate utility to oﬀend (UO), but at the same time, he/she has to bear
the disutility of serving direct punishment (UD). If the individual decides not to oﬀend,
irrespective of whether the law has been enforced or not, he/she will be able to keep
his/her positive reputational eﬀects (UR).
It is the duty of the CJA to ﬁnance the enforcer to deliver sentences and to enforce
the law. Enforcing the law is costly (CE) and so is delivering sentences (CS). Each type
of sentence inﬂicts transaction costs, especially for policing or maintaining the order of
disposals. Suppose the law has been enforced, regardless the actions of individuals, the
enforcer incurs costs to enforce the law (CE). A good example of the enforcement costs
is the costs spent by the US and the UK governments to conduct operations OR aims to
trace paedophiles. The costs to conduct this operation is separate from the costs to keep
paedophiles in prison or to monitor ex-oﬀenders after their are released (CS).
Suppose individuals commit an oﬀence and the law has been enforced, there will be
beneﬁts of enforcing the law (BE). This variable includes the ability of the enforcer to
detect the crime and subsequently send oﬀenders to court, the recovery of some of victims’
materials from oﬀenders and beneﬁts arising from the sentences following conviction. The
last element has been derived from the fact that diﬀerent sentences produce diﬀerent
beneﬁts.
In general the objectives of sentences have several elements which are (Bowles &
Pradiptyo, 2004): a) general deterrence. It provides a signal to potential oﬀenders for not
committing an oﬀence; b) speciﬁc deterrence. The objective of this element of a sentence
is to deter an oﬀender from re-oﬀending in the future; c) punishment; d) rehabilitation;
e) incapacitation. This element of a sentence aims to isolate oﬀenders from the rest of
the society during the serving periods; and f) restitution. The objective of this element of
a sentence is to restore the losses incurred by victims. Each disposal may have diﬀerent
11
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imprisonment does.
It is the enforcer’s duty to achieve objectives determined by the CJA. In case these
objectives are met, the enforcer earns positive reputational beneﬁts (BR) which deﬁnitely
will be obtained if, irrespective of the strategies chosen by the enforcer, the public decide
not to oﬀend (c2 and d2). Suppose individuals committed an oﬀence but the enforcer
decided not to enforce the law, then the crime is undetected (b2).I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
enforcer will not bear any costs however they lose beneﬁts BE.
Consider q be the probability that the enforcer will enforce the law. An individual will
commit an oﬀence if the expected outcomes to oﬀend dominates the expected outcomes
for not to oﬀend:
a1q + b1(1 − q) ≥ c1q + d1(1 − q)
Substituting (3),(4), and (5) to the equation above we obtain:
UO≥ q(UD+UR)
An individual will commit an oﬀence if the utility to conduct such activity dominates
the expected disutility of serving direct punishment and the expected loss of reputational
eﬀect. This equation implies that individuals are fully rational and sophisticated, in the
sense that they conduct a complex cost-beneﬁt analysis in committing an oﬀence, before
they made decisions. A similar method is used by the enforcer to decide whether they are
going to enforce the law. Consider p be the probability of public to oﬀend, thus the law
is going to be enforced if:
a2p + c2(1 − p) ≥ b2p + d2(1 − p)
Substituting (6),(7), (8) and (9) to the equation above we obtain:
pBE ≥ CE + pCS
12
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1990, 1993) and Tsebelis in Bianco et al. (1990) results, the game above does not have
pure strategy equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game is identical
to equations (1) and (2). Substituting (3) to (9) into (1) and (2), the mixed strategy











Since p∗,q ∗ ∈ (0,1) it can be inferred that the underlying assumptions of the model
a r ea sf o l l o w s :
BE >C E + CS
UD + UR >U O
Equation (10) represents the probability of public to oﬀend. In equilibrium, given the
level of punishment (i.e. CE), the probability to oﬀend is the reverse of the beneﬁts:costs
r a t i ot oe n f o r c et h el a w .T h el o w e rt h eb e n e ﬁts:costs ratio of enforcing the law, the higher
the probability that individuals are going to commit oﬀences. Another interpretation of
the equation is that, given the level of enforcement (i.e. CS), the probability of individuals
to commit an oﬀence increases (decreases) as the net beneﬁts of setting the severity of
punishment (i.e. BE − CS) decrease (increase). Suppose individuals observe that for the
perspective of the enforcer, the net beneﬁts of the new level of punishment are higher than
those of the initial level of punishment, ceteris paribus, then the likelihood of individuals
to oﬀend decreases. In order to inﬂuence individuals’ oﬀending behaviour, it is crucial
for the enforcer to implement types of punishments (either direct or indirect) which have
positive net beneﬁts.
Equation (11), on the other hand, represents the enforcer’s probability to enforce the
law. In equilibrium, the probability of the enforcement has a positive correlation with
13
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uals’ reputation eﬀe c tf o rn o tt oo ﬀend (UR) and disutility of serving direct punishment
(UD). As we will discuss in the following sections, any attempts to increase the severity
of punishment aim to increase individuals’ disutility of serving punishment (UD) or rep-
utational eﬀect for not committing an oﬀence (UR) or both.If the enforcer observes that
the impact of the new level of punishment to individuals is an increase in either UD or
UR or both, ceteris paribus, then there is no incentive for the enforcer to increase or to
maintain the level of enforcement.
3.1 Increasing the Severity of Punishment
Throughout this article, we assume that there is a positive correlation between the
severity of punishment and the costs to deliver sentences (CS). The correlation is stronger
in countries where capital punishment has been abolished. The longer the period an
individual is sentenced to either imprisonment or community service, the more expensive
the costs incurred by the government. In England and Wales, for instance, the average
costs to keep an oﬀender in a prison is approximately £30,000 per annum, whereas the
costs of community sentence per oﬀender is about £3,000 per annum (Bowles & Pradiptyo,
2004; Bowles et al 2004).
Many economists in the area of crime economics share the belief that ﬁnes are the
most favourable punishment, as Becker (1968, p. 180) argued:
’The total social cost of punishments is the cost to oﬀenders plus the cost
or minus the gain to others. Fines produce a gain to the latter that equals
the cost to oﬀenders, aside from collection costs, and so the social cost of
ﬁn e si sa b o u tz e r o ,a sb e n e ﬁts a transfer payment. The social cost of proba-
tion, imprisonment, and other punishments, however, generally exceeds that
of oﬀenders, because others are also hurt.’
Nevertheless, empirical studies show that the costs to collect ﬁnes are substantial and
they may increase as the value of ﬁnes increases. According to Chapman et al. (2002)
the costs to collect ﬁnes in the UK is almost one third of the value of the ﬁnes. This
14
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social costs of crime13. In addition, the variations of the costs to collect ﬁnes in the UK
are high, ranging from 11p to 44p per pound collected (Department of Constitutional
Aﬀairs, 2004).
The eﬀectiveness of ﬁnes as a better instrument of imposing sanction as opposed to
other disposals is under scrutiny. In particular this is related to the low payment rate.
In the UK for instance, the rate of payment of ﬁnes in England and Wales is about
55% (Department of Constitutional Aﬀairs, 2004). If this disposal is transformed into
imprisonment, the result can be interpreted as if 45% of prisoners escaped (Bowles &
Pradiptyo, 2004).
The ineﬀectiveness of a small ﬁne was reported by Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) who
conducted an experiment by introducing a small ﬁne to parents who are late in picking
up their children from day-care nurseries. The result shows that imposing a small ﬁne
fails to reduce the unwanted behaviour, on the contrary, it increases the tendency of
the behaviour that was ﬁned. They argued that ﬁne is going to reduce the unwanted
behaviour if it is imposed on a large scale. This argument seems appealing, however in
the area of criminal justice, there is an upper limit of imposing ﬁne which is the wealth
of oﬀenders. A large ﬁne cannot be imposed to oﬀenders with low income or those who
receive unemployment beneﬁts. The eﬀectiveness of ﬁne as a deterrence instrument may
be limited since the majority of oﬀenders come from low income background.
In order to make ﬁnes more credible, many authorities have to adopt a strategy of
transforming the values of ﬁnes with the term of imprisonment period. A failure to pay
the ﬁnes is compensated by serving in prison. This complementari shows that ﬁnes in
i t s e l fm a yn o tb es u ﬃcient to be used as a credible sentence. Furthermore, the costs of
policing and enforcing ﬁnes may not necessarily be lower than other types of sentences
and the higher the ﬁne, the higher the costs of enforcing and policing it. Any attempts
to increase the values of ﬁnes may increase the number of defaults. This gives rise to an
increase in the number of inmates in prison. As a result, ﬁnes may not be a good solution
13See Brand and Price (2000) and Dubourg et al. (2005) for the estimation of social costs of crime in
the UK.
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As discussed in the previous section, there are three possible ways to increase the
severity of punishment which are: 1) increasing the disutility of serving courts’ sentences;
2) increasing the loss of oﬀenders’ reputational beneﬁts; or 3) both. The following sections
discuss the implications of increasing the severity of punishment using these methods.
3.1.1 Increasing the Severity of Direct Punishment
Suppose the CJA decides to increase the severity of direct punishment (UD)b yi n -
creasing the duration of imprisonment or by increasing the ﬁne levied to oﬀenders. In
this case, we obtain:
a
0












S >C S,a n dB0
E >B E.
Although an increase in the severity of direct sentences reduces oﬀenders’ net beneﬁts
to oﬀend, the enforcer may not necessarily in favour of the policy if its beneﬁts are less
than its costs. The implication of this assumption is that the new payoﬀ (a0
2) for enforcer
m a yb el o w e r ,h i g h e ro re q u a lt ot h ep r e v i o u sp a y o ﬀ a2. The new payoﬀ matrix of the







Not Oﬀend c1,c 2 d1,d 2
Game 3
where: a0
1 <a 1 and a0
1 <c 1,a 0
2 T a2 and a0
2 >b 2
So long as the CJA fully compensates any additional costs incurred by the enforcer,
it is assumed that an increase in the severity of punishment will not change either the
enforcement costs (CE) or the beneﬁts of achieving the CJA’s objectives (BR). The policy,
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S >C S) a n di nt u r ni ti n c r e a s e st h e
beneﬁts of enforcement (B0
E >B E). The structure of the game is unchanged and the










1 − d1 + c1














S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tU0
D >U D, an increase in the severity of direct punishment
reduces the likelihood of law to be enforced (q0∗ <q ∗). Nevertheless, there are three
possible impacts of the policy to the likelihood of individuals to oﬀend, namely decrease,
increase or remain constant, and the following conditions apply:





S) > (BE − CS)





S) ≤ (BE − CS)
The likelihood of individuals to oﬀend decreases (increases) if the individuals observe,
given the level of enforcement, that from the enforcer’s perspective the net beneﬁts of an
increase in the severity of direct punishment (UD) is larger (smaller) than the initial level.
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The second route that can be pursued by the CJA is to increase the loss of repu-
tational eﬀect (UR)b o r eb yo ﬀenders who are convicted, given the level of disutility in
serving courts’ sentences (UD). This can be done for instance by extending the probation-
ary period to ex-oﬀe n d e r s ,e x t e n d i n gt h el i s to fj o b st h a tc a n n o tb et a k e nb ye x - o ﬀenders,
or extending the period in which ex-oﬀenders have to report to police when they make
a journey. In this case the decision of individuals to oﬀend means that they are risking
a higher stake of their reputation. From the enforcer’s perspective, this policy entails an



































2 T a2 and a”
2 >b 2,b 0
1 >b 1 and b0
1 <d 1,c 0
1 >c 1 and c0
1 >a 1,d 0
1 >d 1 and
d0
1 >b 1.
Let p”∗ and q”∗ are the new equilibrium for the likelihood of the public and the enforcer
to oﬀend and to enforce the law, respectively. Substituting (3), (7), (8) (9), (16), (17),
and (18) into the payoﬀ matrix, the new mixed strategy equilibrium is as follows:
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Similar to the results from the previous section, this policy reduces the likelihood of
enforcement of the law (q0∗ <q ∗). This occur since it is assumed that U0
R >U R and there
is no impact of the policy to individuals’ immediate utility to oﬀend (UO).
S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a t, it is obvious that an increase in the severity of indirect pun-
ishment there are three possible impacts of the policy to the likelihood of individuals to
oﬀend, namely decrease, increase or remain constant and the following conditions apply:





S) > (BE − CS)





S) ≤ (BE − CS)
3.1.3 A Combined Approach
Another alternative of increasing the severity of punishment is the use of a combined
method, namely the CJA increases the severity of both direct and indirect punishments.
In this case, the policy aims to increase UD and UR simultaneously, thus from public’s
perspective, all of their payoﬀs change. Indeed, the beneﬁt:cost ratios of this policy may
be diﬀerent from those of the previous policies and subsequently payoﬀ a2 changes as
follow:
ˆ a2 = ˆ BE − (CE + ˆ CS) (21)
where: ˆ CS = C0
S + C”
S
Similar to the previous policies, it cannot be determined whether ˆ a2 is lower or higher
or equal to its initial payoﬀ a2. The payoﬀ m a t r i xo ft h eg a m ei sa sf o l l o w s :
19
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1 <a 1 and a0
1 <c 1,a 0
2 T a2 and ˆ a2 >b 2,b 0
1 >b 1 and b0
1 <d 1,c 0
1 >c 1 and
c0
1 >a 1
Let ˆ p∗ and ˆ q∗ are the new equilibrium under the new policy for the likelihood of the
public and the enforcer to oﬀend and to enforce the law, respectively. Substituting (7),














Similar to results from the previous sections, the policy may not necessarily reduce the
likelihood of individuals to oﬀend. So long as the marginal beneﬁt:cost ratio of the new
policy is undetermined, it cannot be guaranteed that the policy reduces the likelihood of
individuals to oﬀend.
Indeed there are various methods available to increase the severity of punishment,
however, there is not necessarily that the beneﬁts of each method dominate its costs.
The policy implication of the results, thus far, are clear. It is imperative for the enforcer
to choose interventions which, from the enforcer’s perspective, their beneﬁts dominate
their costs. This can be done by adopting similar interventions implemented elsewhere
which proven that their beneﬁt:cost ratios are larger than 1. If this can be observed
by individuals or the enforcer sends a signal to the public by announcing the beneﬁt:cost
ratio of the interventions, then the enforcer may be able to inﬂuence individuals’ oﬀending
behaviour.
Up to this point, the results suggest that any attempt to increase the severity of
punishment certainly reduces the likelihood of enforcement of the law. The results hold
so long as we assume that any increase in the severity of punishment aﬀects either UD,
20
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is no reason to the enforcer to maintain or to increase the level of enforcement if it is
observed that the policy increases individuals’ disutilities of serving courts’ sentences
without altering the utility of individuals to oﬀend
We extend the analysis by relaxing the assumption above and assumeing instead that
oﬀenders’ utility to oﬀend (UO) may also increase as the severity of punishment increases.
The more severe punishment given to drug traﬃckers, for instance, tends to increase the
selling price of drugs, which leads to an increase in the proﬁt of the activities. So long as
there are individuals who percieve that the expected beneﬁts of such activities may exceed
their expected costs, there will be attractions to conduct such activities. There is also
a tendency that oﬀenders tend to get more admiration from their peers if they commit
crime with severe punishment. Suppose we follow this assumption to game 5 above, the









where: ˚ a1 T a1 and˚ b1 >b 1.










Substituting (7), (8), (9), (17), (21), (24) and (25) into payoﬀ matrix in game 6, we
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determined that the likelihood to enforce the law decreases due to the implementation of
the policy. There are three possible impacts of the policy to the likelihood that the law












R = UR+∆UR and ∆UO,∆UD,∆UO ∈ R+,
substituting the respective values and re-arranging the equation above, q0∗ <q ∗ if:
∆UO < ∆UD + ∆UR
Using a similar method, q0∗ ≥ q∗ if the following condition holds:
∆UO ≥ ∆UD + ∆UR
So long as an increase in UR or both UD and UR is followed by an increase in UO,a n d
an increase in UO dominates either an increase in UR or both UR and UD, there will be
an increase in the probability to enforce the law.
3.2 Crime Prevention Initiatives
Another method to reduce the number of oﬀences is by preventing individuals from
h a v i n gac r i m i n a lc a r e e r .T h i st y p eo fi n t e r v e n t i o n si sw i d e l yk n o w na sac r i m ep r e v e n t i o n
initiative. In the most extreme case, this programme can be interpreted as providing a
subsidy to individuals for not committing a crime. Theoretically this intervention is
feasible, even though in reality, crime prevention initiatives have mostly conducted by
providing support to a group of individuals who are at risk of committing an oﬀence. Early
intervention initiatives in criminal justice, that target children and youths at risk, can be
classiﬁed as a crime prevention programmes. The Perry preschool14 and Abercaidan
preschool15 initiatives in the US, and also Safer School Partnership (SSP) in the UK16,
are examples of such initiatives.
14See Karoly et al. (2001)
15See Clarke and Campbell (1998), and Karoly et al. (2001).
16See Youth Justice Board (2005).
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Oﬀend a1,a 2 β1,β2
Not Oﬀend γ1,γ2 δ1,δ2
Game 7
where: a1 <γ 1,a 2 >β 2,β 1 <δ 1,γ2 <δ 2
Under this setting, individuals who are not convicted are entitled to receive transfer
payment from the enforcer, regardless of their actions. In other words, only those who
oﬀend and are convicted do not receive transfer payment, thus we obtain the following
payoﬀs:
β1 = UO + TR + UR (28)
γ1 = δ1 = TR + UR (29)
where:
TR = The value of transfer payment received from the enforcer.
If the enforcer decides not to enforce the law and the public do commit an oﬀence, not
only do oﬀenders enjoy the utility of committing an oﬀence (UO) and keep their reputation
eﬀect (UR) intact, but also they receive transfer payment (TR). In this circumstance,
there is no opportunity for individuals to be excluded from other members of society from
receiving the subsidy. From the perspective of the enforcer, so long as the CJA fully
ﬁnances the initiative then the elements in a2 are unchanged. Other payoﬀs for enforcer
(i.e. b2,c 2,a n dd2), however, change as follows:
β2 = −CP (30)
γ2 = BR − CE − CP (31)
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where:
CP = the costs of crime prevention initiative.
Indeed, the programme increases the enforcer’s total spending although it does not
aﬀect the level of enforcement of the law. The new mixed strategy equilibrium of the








β1 − δ1 + γ1 − a1










UD + UR + TR
(35)
Obviously the result shows that ˜ p∗ <p ∗ and ˜ q∗ <q ∗. This implies that the implemen-
tation of crime prevention initiatives decreases both public’s and enforcer’s probabilities
to oﬀend and to enforce the law, respectively. It should be noted that the results hold
given the levels of enforcement and punishment. The policy implication of the results is
that crime prevention initiatives are eﬃcient to reduce individuals’ oﬀending behaviour
provided the authority does not reduce the levels of enforcement and punishment. Any
attempts to reduce the levels of either the enforcement, or the severity of punishment
or both, in order to ﬁnance the implementation of crime prevention initiatives does not
sustain the results above.
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tives are more compelling than any attempts to increase the severity of punishment. This
occur since the results of our analysis suggest that the impact of the former to individ-
uals’ behaviour is less umbiguous than that of the latter. One crucial factor which have
not been captured in our analysis is the comparison of resources required to implement
both policies. The resources required to distribute a subsidy to those who do not have
a criminal record may be more exhpensive than those of any attempts to increase the
severity of punishment.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
We show that both increasing in the severity of punishment and initiating crime
prevention initiatives may inﬂuence individuals’ oﬀending behaviour. The impact of the
latter to reduce the probability of individuals to oﬀend is more certain than the former,
provided that the levels of enforcement and the severity of punishment remain constant.
The results show that regardless the interventions, the structure of the games do not
change. Since the solutions of the games are in mixed strategy equilibrium, in contrast
to Becker’s (1968) model, these imply that total reduction in the number of oﬀences is
impossible.
From the perspective of the enforcer, implementing crime prevention initiatives is more
appealing than any attempts to increase the severity of punishment. One crucial factor
which have not been captured in our analysis is the comparison of resources required to
implement both policies. Crime prevention initiatives may require much more resources
than the policies to increase the severity of punishment. It is implicitly assumed in our
models that if the law is enforced, then all incidents and oﬀences committed by individuals
will be detected. In reality, due to various reasons17, this may not be the case since there
always be oﬀences undetected and unrecorded by the authority. Certaintly this creates
diﬃculties for the enforcer to diﬀerentiate those who have committed an oﬀence and
17e.g., victims and witnesses may be terriﬁed or ashamed to report to police, no witnesses present at
t h et i m eo ﬀences were committed, or oﬀences cannot be observed by police.
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phenomenon, however it may not be easy to do it in game theoretical perspective.
The underlying assumption of the games above is based on a conventional criminal
justice system which is mostly applied in the US and in Europe. It would be interesting
to extend the analysis to model a game theoretical model for shariah law, in which the
level of punishment tends to be more severe and the victims (or their families) have a
right to inﬂuence the severity of punishment.
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